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EUROPEAN ALLIANCES
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ALUANCES AND THE LEAGUE
But the League of Nations' Covenant, which
was intended as a cOllstitution for the nations
of the world, did not prohibit alliances. Its
Article 18 expressly sanctioned the oonclusion
of a1lianccs, although under one condition:
Every treat·y or intemational engagement ent.ered
into hereaft·er by 1lD)' Member of the League llbllll be
Most alliances are concluded for a definite
period of time, while a union or federation is
not. The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria,
and Italy of 1882, for example, was ooncluded
for five years and afterwards frequently re-
newed for the same period each time. Usually
an alliance is also directed against one or
several specifio adT'ersaries. Thus the famous
Grand Alliance of 1689 was directed against
Louis XIV of }'rance and the Quadruple Alliance
of 1814 against Napoleon. However, to be an
alliance a treaty docs not necessarily have to
be called by this name. More important than
the text of the agreement is the purpose behind.
It also makes a difference who the partners
concluding an alliance are. What may be a
true alliance in the case of two equals, may be
nothing but a protectorate when concluded
between nonequals as, for example, the so-
called alliances concluded between Great ahtain
and Iraq in 1922, or between Italy and Albania
in 1927. The most potent alliances in history
were those born of common desire for 'booty
or from fear of a common enemy.
Whatever definition one may apply ~o al-
liances, there was no need for them after the
end of the Great War. The "ictors had taken
all the booty they wanted, and their enemies,
particularly Germany, were completely crushed,
without armies, and torn-. by internal chaos.
If evei' therO' as a situation with perfeot
psychological a weU as factual conditiolls for
abolishing the alliance system, it was that in
which Europe found itself at the close of the
first World War.
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H'hw 0,. December 10. 1941, SIn"n emd De Gaulle
OO,lJ;lud«l un CllJumce, the entire problem of alliancu
and pacllJ, ''''Iich had played el httye role in Europ«m
lIi1J1ory. WUlI reopelled.
THE VERDIOT Al'TER WORLD WAR I
WHEN at the end of the first WorldWar people tried to determine thecauses which had brought about that
catastrophe, many believed to find it
in the European system of allianccs. Taking
at random some Amerioan university textbooks
on modem history, we find statements such as
~hesc :
rtlof.lt important Bmong the underlying causes of
the World \Var Wall tho development aJDong tlulfle
Iltllt.e8 of Europe of a theory of entangling alliances.
(\'. L. U6J11l11, 1'~"rope Sinee 1914.)
The confliot of allianco systemll has seemed to many
scllOlars the mOllt important cautle of the World War.
(Haymond Jwnos Sontag, EuropceJ/l DiploTrUatic liii/·
tory.)
The alliance8 became the menace to Europea.n
peace .... Izvolsky and Poincare wore Imccellllful in
1912 in tl'lUUlforming the Triple Entente lto'rt\Jlce.
KWIlIia, England) from a defenl'ive into an offensive
alliance. (John GeilMl, Men arid lIu. lVuUm World.)
Public opinion in general tended severely t.o
criticize the European alliances of pre-Wurld
War I days and the spirit which they rep-
reeented, and many were the voices demanding
that never again should a system of alliances
be allowed to develop in Europe. One of the
hopes connected with the League of Nations
W88 that it would take over the solving of
controversies between states and thus dispense
with alliances. President Woodrow Wilson, in
a 8pecch of September 27, 1918. clearly stated:
"There can be no eagu08, or alliances, or special
oovenantll and undel'8tandings within tho general and
common family of the League of Nations. ..
There are two extremes in the J>088ible re-
lationships between states. One is the rela-
tioDBhip between states which are not bound
hy any political ties and havc not committed
themselves to co-ordinate their polici<.'8. The
other is a federation or union as, for example,
the USA or the USSR with no independence
whatever in foreign affairs for the member
litates. The alliance is halfwny between the
two extremes, approaching in some instances
the first, in others the second.
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forthwith registered with t.he Seeretariat, and shall as
800n .,,; p08sible be published by it. No such treaty
or int.crnational engAgement shall be binding until 80
registered.
Far from preventing new alliances, this
article even had a contrary effect: the govern-
ments felt that the alliances registered with the
League's Secretariat were, so to speak, legalized
by t,he League and by public opinion, although
the Secretariat had no power to refuse the reg-
istration of a trea.ty.
Articles 20 and 21 expose the ambiguity of
the Covenant. While Article 20 denounces "all
obligations or understandings between the
Members of the League which are inconsistent
with the terms of the Covenant," Article 21
reads:
Nothing in this CO\'enant shall be doomed to affect
the vaJidity of intemational engagements, SU('\I .\S
treat.ies of arbitra.tion or regional understandings like
the :\lonroe doctrine, for securing the maintenmlCe of
peace.
This latter article matle it possible for any
nation to claim that the alliance which it was
about to conclude was "a regional understand·
ing for securing the maintenance of peace."
For e\'en the slight limitation contained in the
word "regional" was overcome when France
claimed that the term referred not only to
states related by geography but also to states
"cormected by the community of thcir in·
tere. ts." And so, in spite of the severe public
verdict against allianccs, there were at no other
period in history so many pacts concluded as
in the twenty years after the signing of the
LcaJ];ue of N ~Ltions' CO\7ellllont. Over 1,000
treaties werc registered with the League's
Secretariat between 1919 and 1939.
FRA.NCE'S RE.~SO:S AND ALIBI
Between the two World Wars, France was the
dri\-iug power bchind 'the erection of this tower
of Babel consisting of pacts and alliances. The
reason which prompted France to do this was
always the same: fcar of Germany. This fear
was a psychological if not pat,hological factor
of grave importance and issued from two
sources. :First, froUl France's feeling of weak-
ness, fostered by her declining birth rate, the
bourgeOis character of her people, and the
realization of her inability to fight Germany
singlehanded. Secondly, }'rance's fear was the
result. of an-ullaumitted-g"ilt,y conscience
over the treatment she had accorded Germany
at Versaille8, closely linked with her assumption
that Germany after 1919 was as desirous of
re\'enge as Franco had been aftcr lSi!. The
effect of this assumption was not lessened b~'
the fact t.hat it was mistaken. Anyone who
knew the Germany of the twenties realized that,
in spite of Versailles and the Rubr invasion,
the Germans, with the exception of small
although vociferous gr'oups, hlld 110 other desire
than to heal the dreadful wounds of the war
and to adjust themselves to the new conditions
-provided the others allowed them to do this.
To harself and t.o the rest of the world,
France tried to justify her ceaseless quest for
aUiances with the disappointment she suffered
at the hands of Great Britain and America. In
1911J,France signed identical treaties of guaran-
tee with Great Britain and the United States.
They provided for these two countries to "come
immediately to Franco';; assistance in the ovent
of any unprovoked movement of /\'ggres;;ion
against her being made by Germany." But
thel:le two treaties, which might perhaps have
satisfied France's urge for security, suffered a
sad fate. The United States Senate repudiated
the Franco·American treaty; thereupon the
Franco-British treaty, alt.hough ratifi'ed, also
became void, as its acceptance had bcen made
"contingent upon the United States Govern·
ment undertaking the same obligations."
In 1921 France once more attempted to get
Britain to agree to a political alliance. But the
British were willing at the most to promise
I'rance assistance in case of a direct German
invasion of France, which not even the most
nervous Frenchman expected at that time. In
July 1922, further negotiations cam1l to noth·
ing. Although the whole League waa in
reality nothing but a gigantic pact-system in
itself designed to guarantee France the fruits
of victory, France felt that sho had been be-
trayed by her two great war· time allies and
that she had the moral right to find security
through other a.Lliancc8. With whom should
she conclude them? All those nations in-
terested in the preservation of the European
situation as it had been fixed at Versaille!) were
potential allies for France. Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Belgium:
they had all either been given something that
had formerly belonged to Germany and her
allies, or been newly created at the expense of
others. Poland feared the Soviet Union and
Germany; Rumania feared the Soviet Union,
Hungary and Bulgaria; Czechoslovakia feared
Gel'many, Austria and Hungary; Yugoslavia
feared Austria, Hunga-ry and Bulgaria; and
Belgium fearod Germany.
THE rrRST STJ,:PS
France has an old and tried tradition of ant.i·
German alliances. In her desire to keep the
C:lnter of Ew'ope as weak as possible, France
has for centuries followed the policy of con·
cluding allia.nces with nations in EastPfII Europe
in order thus to put Central Europe in the
jaws of a pincer from west and east. The
"most Christian King" of France wa.'; jUfit, as
willing to conclude an alliancp with the Moslem
Turk~ (1536), at that time the uread of nil
Europe, as capitalist-bourgeois France was with
the Bol~leviks. France was ready to forgive
t.hem being anti·European as long as they
werc at the same time anti-German.
When, in the first period after the Great
War, there cxist.cd no paramount. power in
EUROPEAN ALLIANCES
Eastern Europe, France based her lleCurity
8)'stem on alliances with two lleCondary Eastern
European stat.es: Poland (1921) and Czecho-
slovakia (11l24). (Details of all alliances and
pacts mentioned wiIJ be found at the end of
this article.) The three governments con-
sidered their alliances so integral a part. of their
foreign policy that, contrary to cust~m, the
treaties did not mention any time limit. They
also openly stated their pnrpose: the preserva-
tion of the statu8 quo as it had been established
at Versailles; moreover, they were mea·nt to
check whatever re\'isionist sentiment there
might ha\"'e t'xisted in the defeated countries at
that time. Even earlier, in 1920, France and
Belgium had signed a military agreement.
Thus, less than five years after the formation
of the League of Nations, which allegedly
ushered in a new age of international relations,
}~rance had forged a chain of military alliances
with three govcrnments. This was clearly
against the spirit-if not against the letter-of
the League. It expressed France's lack of
confidence in thi", organization in which she
herself at that time was pll\)'ing the leading
role, and it greatly contributed to the undt'rmin-
ing of the Leaguo.
To this inner ring of French alliances were
added the Locllrno treaties (11)25) and the
treaties of friendship and nonaggression with
Humania (1920) and Yugoslavia (1927). While
the latter two both gave the pre.liCrvation of the
8tatus qUQ as their aim, Locarno consisted of a
complicated system of treaties all designed to
guarantee France and Belgium their eastern
frontiers from any German attack.
THE I·RANCO·SOVIET ..\Ll.JA:\CE
''"hen by the end of the twenties Gf'rmany's
recovery seemed to make quick and un·
expected progrells, France felt that her system
of pacts was no longer sufficient, Pat.ient.ly she
began to prepare the road for Illl alliance with
the Soviet Union which, by the Hheer weight
of population and resources, had by then re-
entered the ranks of the great powers. The
Iltel' on this road were: 1. Nona~ssion pact
between France's aUy, Poland, and the USSR
(1932). 2. A Franco-Soviet nonaggression paet
(1932). 3. Spon",ored by France, the ent.ry of
the USSR into the League of Na.tions (W34).
4. An actuRI Franco·Soviet alliance (1!l35).
Thitl alliance was a masterpiece of legalistic
phraseology. France, the leading power ill the
League of Nations, and the USSH., the newly
won com-ert to that institution, were both
equally eager t.Q conceal the anti-League spirit
of the treaty by constantly rt'ferring in it to
the Lea.gue's Covenant. They tried to create
the impression that the t.reaty was wholly
within the Covenant's framework and had no
other object dUln to Rtrengthen and confirm it.
Yet the treaty had a Supplemf'ntary Protocol
which contains in its Article 1 the following
sentences (italics ours):
It is agreed that Article 3 binds each of the high
contracting parties to render the other immediate
8ll8iHtance by immediately following the recommenda-
tions of the Council of t.he League of Nations 88 800n
88 these have been i8Hued on the baBia of Article 16
of the League of Nations. It is also agreed that the
two high contracting plU'tiOll will act in common in
order to achieve t.hat tho Council of the League of
Nations i88uOlI ita recommendations wit.h 811 tho IIpeed
neceNlitated by clroumllt.ances, and that il the COUlicil
of Ihe I wflUe 01 Nol,o'll1 should 'leverlhe/ul1 Jor "on~
real/Otl il/I/1,e no recoII,lIIelldllti01l8, or 1J 110 wlunimou8
dedl/ioll ill arrived at, the obligation lor '''/It/lul u81/i8tCUlce
oPl'/if\8 tlOlill the IU8,
Complicated as the wording of those sen-
tencell is, one thing is quite clear: France and
the U. R are obliged to give each other mili-
tary aid even if this should be contrary to the
League's decision. Thus the League had def-
initely lost !lily power which it might ha.ve had
over European affairs. Two weeks later a
similar treaty, also sponsored by France, was
conoluded between the USSR and Czecho-
slovakia.
Almost one year passed before the Franeo-
Soviet Alliance was ratified. During this period,
Gt>rmany warned to'ranee time and again of the
serious consequences the ratification would
t'ntail for the future of German-F'renoh relat.ions
and of Europe. Nevertheless, on :February 21,
IU36, t,he French Chamber agreed w the al-
liance. On Man'h 7 Adolf Hitler made a his-
toric speech before t he German Reioh~tag:
"Through the now "'rllnco·Soviet Pact tho thrent·
lUling military power of I' gi~antic empire loBI! onten.'<l
tho hourt of Europe with U d ...tour via Czochoslovilkia.
The irnpo88ible 8ituotion which hM now orill6n con·
sists in the fllct thllt, without taking into consideration
II " ...<'iNion of tho Lengue of Nat,ioM' Council whioh
eithor has heen or is uXI>C('led 10 be rondered, }o'rlUlce
Ilnd tho Soviet l"nion ('ommitted themseh'Oll, in tho
ovenl of Eastorn European ent.anglement8, to !leU Ie
the question of guilt 8c('ordinjZ to their own irleBJ!....
Jo'rallce fonnerly had mutual-assistanco agreements
with CzcchOlllovnkia BIl well &B with Pollllld. Ger·
mUll)' took no exception to them not only beclluse
thoBO flactll, in eontrust to the Fnmco·Soviet Pact,
worn within the framework of t,ho Le..~uo of Notions,
but Illeo boc,sUflO C7.6CJhoslovllkia and Pohuld h8ve
"Iwa)'s primarily follo\\'od .. poli.·)' in llccorrioncll with
their nlltional intcrcllu Germllny docs not dellirc to
/lUlld, t h6liO stotes, nor d0t"8 she bf-lipve it to lit:" in
the int.erest of these IIt,ates to launch an IItt ..~k ulJOn
Ger,,,,..,,,. Above all, Poland will remain Poland,
l'r8nc:e will nlIDIlin jo'rance.
Soviet RU88ia, however, ill the constitution'ally
organized eXJlonet;lt of revolution. Hs Slate creed is
itK l'HpOU881 of tHe caullO of world ",volution. It is
impossible to det.ermine whether or not tomorrow or
the day after tomorrow thill creed may a.1ao trilunph
ill Jo'rlUH'O, Should Hud, an eventuality occur nd.
M a Gennan slllte8t1llUl, I must ('onsidcr thit! J>OlI-
Ilibility-then a Holshe\'illt FraJ1c-e would llt'Come "
section of the Holshe"j,lt international. lUld the deci·
Ilion concerning aggr_ion or nODagg""",ion will be
mude b" her. not in aecordance with her o"'n objectives
ond dosir08, but under directions from 1\I0800\\'.
On tho bl\8i8 of information given by the Soviet
Govornment., M. Herriot, informed the "'rench Chamber
1.1081. Ule RWlllian Army hM a peace-time IItrel/gth of
1,350,000 men; that it comprises 17,500.000 men in
"'tAr strength and ~r\"(lll; that its tank equipment
ond air force are the IIU'g000t in the world. The intro-
duction of thill mOllt powerful of "u military fuetor&.
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which W!L8 also described 118 excellent in its mobility
and leadership and at all tilDes ready to prove its
mettle. into the Central European field of operation.
destroys every genuine European balance of power."
In the climax of his speech the German
Chancellor declared that the Franco-Soviet
Treaty had automatically relieved Germany of
her obligation, undertaken in Locarno in 1925,
to keep the German Rhineland demilitarized.
While he was still speaking, units of the German
Reichswehr re-cntered the Rhineland.
THE LITTLE l';NTENTE
The Frencb alliances and pacts with Belgium,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia,
and the USSR were linked to a. similar, although
much smaller svstem of alliances known as the
Little Entente:
The Little Entente consitlted of those nations
ill southeastern Europe which had profited by
the Great War and was born from their desire
to f:l&feguard their gains through co-operation.
At first thitl combine was also to include Poland
and Greece; but the bitter hostility between
Poland and Soviet Russia and between Poland
and Lithuania, Poland's quarrel with Czecho-
slovakia over Teschen, as well as the Greco-
Turkish War raging at that time, made it
undesirable to include these two states. Thus
Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia re-
mained. The Little Entente was organized in
UJ20/21 by the conclusion of three bilate-ral
alliances which each of them concluded with
the other two, all of them clearly of the pro-
statUJj gun type, openly mentioning Hungary and
Bulgaria as the nations against which they
were directed.
At first the three countries did not act as a
unit. Individually thcy also had treaties with
otber n1Ltion8 and co-ordinated their policy
only as far as it concerned Hungary and Bul-
garia. Clarity was also lacking in their foreign
policy because, in the beginning, they tried to
co-operate both with France and Italy, which
two countries did not always see eye to eye.
H was only when, under the influence of Musso-
lini, Italy began to go her own way in the second
half of the twenties that the Little Entente
became definitely oriented toward France. It
was in particular the fear of quickly recovering
Hungary, which ente-rtained friendly relations
with Italy, that drove the three nations into
ever closer co·operation.
During the following years the little Entente
wont through three stages, growing from an
alliance almost to a federation. (1) In 1929 the
three individual treaties were completely co-
ordinated; the clause on arbitration wa>l the
first step toward regional federation. (2) In
1930 it was agreed to convoke periodicnJ con-
ferences of the three Foreign Ministt'fs for a
closer co-ordination of their countries' foreign
policies. (3) Benes, Foreign Minister of Czecho-
slovakia. was anxiolls for still closer co-opera-
tion. III a possihlp cOllflict between Fmnl'c
and Germany, Czechoslovakia would, by the-
Locarno Treaty, be automatically involved,.
while Rumania and Yugoslavia had no 8uch
obligations. In 1933, sixteen days after Hitler'
came into power, the so-called "Pact of Organi-
zation" was signed at Benes's initiative. Thi.&
climax in the Little Entente's development
completely co-ordinated the foreign policy of
its member states.,. It would, Benes hoped,
create a new first-class power consisting of the
three federated states. Most important was
the Pact's Article 6 :
Any political treaty of any st·ate of the Little Entente,
~y one·sidod action which alters the political situa·
tlOn of one of the states of the Little Entente with
regard t.o a third state. as well as any economic agree-
ment entailing important political consequences. will
from now 011 require the unanimous consent of the
Council.
At first glance one might feel inclined t~
applaud this gradual merging of three minor
stat-es into a large political unit. One might
see in it a promising attempt t·o restore some·
thing of the Gros8raum in the Balkan Peninsula
which had been destroyed by the Paris peace-
makers when they hacked the. Hapsburg
monarchy to pieces. Yet from the point of
view of European politics the Little Entente
turned out to be an obstructive factor. For it
owed its existence purely to the desire to keep
down Hungary and Bulgaria and to prevent a
strengthening of Austria and Germany through
their union. Not without justification has the
Little Entente pact of 1933 been called "II. pa.ct
against life," as it was directed against the
normal growth of certain states and thereby
intensified t.he conflicts in southeastern Europe_
Even if one of the three countries should some
day summon sufficient common sense to meet
the justified wishes of one of the states which
stood for revision (Germany, Austria, Hungary,
Bulgaria), it would, according to Article 6
(quoted above) not be allowed to follow such a
policy, since its' foreign policy had become
dependent on the consent of its t.wo partners.
Still, it would have been interE'sting to study
the results of the "Pact of Organization" over
an extended period of years. But the Little
Entente did not give itself a chance to prove
its worth. Czechoslovakia concluded her al-
liance with the USSR and was thus drawn
into the game of power politics for which Elhe
was not equipped and in which sLe perished.
The French structure of alliances thus COIl-
sisted of three syRteD18. There were in the first
place her pacts with Belgium, Poland, Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslayia, and Rumania; then there
was the triangle of military alliances between
the USSR and France and between the USSR
and Ol.echoslovakia; and there was finally the
Little Entente with its close dependence on
Fmnce. The point of junction of all three
systems was Prague. This explains the huge
importance of Czechoslovakia for France and
nll'lo thH nttitude of Gf'rmllny towllrd Pra/lUf·.
EUROPEAN ALLIANCES
~EO-E~TENTE CORDJALE
To this pact structure one more system was
added, the neo·E"llente Cordiale. After the
Great War, Great Britain had returned to her
policy of "splendid isolation." The only com·
mi~numt on the Continent which she had as-
sumed was the Treaty of Locarno, through
which she gave France some of that feeling of
security which France had so urgently soliCIted.
But how little inclined England was to meet
her obligations, and how she was dptermined
to preserve for herself the decisil)n when and
how to act, was shown in 1936 when Germany,
following upon the FI'ttIlco-Soviet alliance, de-
clared Locarno null and void ami remilitarized
the Rhineland. To be sure, London sent a
prutest t.o .Herlin. But that was 01'. She
did not wish to employ sanctions against
Germany.
But lest France's disappointment OV('f :Eng-
land's attitude and the frequent German over-
tUreR tl) }O'rance should lead to the possibility
of a Franco-Gt'rman rapprochement, Great Brit-
lIin, less thl\.l1 a mOllth after !lhe hl\d practically
cOllsented to the remilitarizl\tion of the Rhine-
land, sent notcs to .J<"rnnce and Belgium, dc-
daring her readiness t.o carryon joint staff
talks. In December of the saml:' year, 1936,
statemcnts were made in the French Chamber
allli in the British Parliament promising mutual
assistance in the case of an unpro'Toked~German
attack, which meant in fact the restorat·ion of
the Entent.e Cordiale. These dl'clarations and
thl' Iltate ,-iilit. of King Geor,ge VI to Paris in
.J uly 1938, increased Fra.nce's dependence on
Great. Britain. Tho logical consequence of this
was that the fllt(·ful decisions with regard to
the German-Polish quarrel in 1939 were made
in London and not in Paris.
THE rACT roLIC).' OF THE USSR
To find the extreme opposite of the French
paet policy we must turn to that of the Soviet
Union. In doing so, we must keep one fact
in mind: the USSH. is not a state like others.
On the contrary, it is a. sta.te which considers
it.self the cell of a world state and which is in
fundamental opposition-sometimes outspoken,
sometimes silent-to aU the other, the so-called
capitalistic statR..s. During the first three quar-
ters of the period under review, i.e., up to the
early thirties, this opposition and the Soviet
l:!taw's unique J>OI'Iition were frequently and
proudly admit,ted by Moscow; and if, in the
course of the thirties and particulnrly during
the second World War, Moscow hu..'1 taken a
d.iaerent prop3J,!andistic line, this Wlll'! the result
of a chauge of circumstances, not of the Sm'iet
Union.
As a speciul type of state the USSR has also a
special type of foreign policy. a double-barreled
foreign policy. One is official, represented
by the People's Commissariat for }o'oreigu
Affairs, the other uno1l1cial, represented by the
57
communist organizations throughout the world.
The first is a concession to the fact that the
states in the rest of the world are old-fashioned
states with which somehow or other the old-
fashioned diplomatic rela.tioJUI must be carried
on; the other is the expression of the true
nature of the Soviet sta.te. Here wo are only
concerned with the official foreign policy of t.he
USSR.
Ever since it was inaugurated, the official
foreign policy had one main object: to obtain
conditions under which Moscow could pursue
its unofficial and real foreign policy as securely
and energetically as possible. More conoretely,
the official foreign policy of the Bolshevist
Rtate up to the outbreak of the second World
War i8 explained by three facts: 1088 of con-
siderable territories in the course of the Rev-
olution: fear of intervention by the capitalist
states; hostility toward National Socialist (kr-
many.
(I) In the course of the Rolshevist Rev-
olution, a number of areas conquered or annexed
by the TRars in previous centuries made them-
selves independent of RlII~sian rule. It was the
first task of Soviet foreign policy t.o reannex as
many of them as possible. It stlcceeded-
Accompanied by force--in the ('ase of White
RussiA, the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbeijan, Ar-
menia. Khiva, Bokha.ra. It failed with Fin-
land, EHtoniu. Lat.via, Lithuania. Poland, a.nd
Be.'lSarabia.
(2) The combined intervention of Great
Britain ....·rance, America. and Japan during
the years 1918 to 1022 had gi vcm rille to serious
apprehension in Moscow tha.t thi!! intervention
might btl repeated; and if Churchill, the leader
of the anti·Soviet policy, tried to erect a
r.ordon "anitaire of buffpr states against
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union on its part
labored patiently for many yearN toward the
erection of its own rordon. so,nitaire. The aim
was to establish relations wit·h the neighbors of
the USSR which would make it very difficult.,
if not impossible, for the grea.. powerl'l to use
thema!l 1\ jumping-off place for a.n I\ttack on
the cradle of world revolution. Moscow built
up this (~ounter-co"do1/. sal/itoiTf' by meuns of a
multitude of pacts :
(a) It concluded. peace treatieJ4 with its
neighbnrs (withwthe exception of Rumania).
(b) It obtained in one way or another recogni-
tion by the great majority of states (llmong the
exception!! up to W39 were Swit.zerland and
Yugoslavia). (c) It concluded (IH2!i-IH32) non-
aggrclision l'BCtl:l with all its neigh bor" (except
Rumo.nin) and also some stat.es that. were not
neighhors. (d) It signed the so-called Litvinov
proweols with all its neighbors (including Ru-
mania. excluding Finland) in 1I12!J. (e) In 193:1
it sponsored the so-called "London Agreement
for the Definition of the Aggressor," whicb was
signed by the Soviet Union und all its neighbors
in Europe and in the Near East., all well us by
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Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. (f) 011 Sep-
tember 18, 1934, it entered the League
of Nations. Although formerly Moscow
had bitterlv ricliculed this institution as an
organ of ('~pitalist. exploitation and had been
most eager to include neutra.lity clauses in
its nonaggression pacts, there was a
good deal in common bl'tween the political
ideologies of the League and t.he Soviet Union.
Both now illsi:!ted t.hat the world and hence also
peace and war WE're indivisible; tha.t every
quarrel betwE'en nations involved the rest of
the worlcl; that thE're could be no :!tlCh thing as
neutrality. Within a short time, the Soviet
Union succeeded in huilding up a very strong
position within the many committees of the
League.
(3) Having neutralized it:! neighbors as far
as possible by this flood of pacts, the Soviet
Union took t.he next, step and concluded the
alliances wit.h J?rance and Czechoslovakia.
They were clearly directed against National
Socialist Germa.ny, the cru:!hing of which had
by now become the chief aim of Moscow's
official as well as unofficinJ foreign policy.
(4) When Stalin found that the Soviet-
Franco-Czech 111liance prevented neither the
further growth of Germany nor the Soviet
Union's humiliation in Munich, he dp,cided on a
different move. B.v concluding the famous
treaty with Berlin i.n August HJ3!1, he helped
to bring about the outbreak of war between
Germany and the \Vestcrn powers in the coursc
of which he hoped to get rid of his most danger-
ous foe without havin~ to fight !limsE'lf.
And so we hR\'e the following picture: 80V'iet
foreign policy, revolut.ionary though it was and
is in its aim and essence, was conser\'lltive in
its appearance and led Moscow into such ex-
treme status quo institutions as the League of
Nations and the alliance with France. Is this
contrad ict-ory" Only to those who are 1101,
familiar with Bolfo!hc\'iilt dinJectics.
WA\'!':lU:\O rrALY
Next to France and the USSR., Ita.ly was the
country with t.he most active foreign policy.
Rut she suffered from the ambiguous nature
of her political position. On the one band, she
belonged to the mnk,; of the victol's and was
.as lIch sent.imentally connected with her Greut
War allies and interested in the preservation of
her wn.r gains, especially South Tirol. On the
other hand. Italv felt that she had not received
II fair denl' fron~ her allie:!-she ha.d not been
given all that she had uE'en promi:!f:'d for joining
the Allied calllp during the war-and was
therefore sympathetic to those who pleaded
rE'vision of the treatieR. That Italy never
quite overcame this ambiguity is proved by
her pl'esent sorry plight. Yet during the years
between the World Wars she underwent a
change. During the first few years her position
as a country favoring the status qlW was Illore
pronounced; during the late twenties and
during the thirties, she adopted more of It
pro-revision attitude. At first (1924-1926),
Haly concluded typicnJ pro-status q1UJ treaties
with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Ruma,nia.
But gradually her rivalry with Yugoslavia over
their positions in and around the Adrilltjc,
particularly the treaties which she concluded
with Albania, strained her relations with Yugo.
slavia and thereby with the Litt.le Entente.
While Rome did not renew its treaties with
the countries of the Little Entente, it con·
cluded treaties (1927-1930) with Hungary and
Austria, Le., states living in st,rained relations
with the Little Entente; and in 1n30 it cemented
its friendship with equally revisionist Bulgaria
through the marriage of an Italian princess
with King Boris. In two speeches in Mila.n
and Venice (1930), Mussolini declared himself
openly in favor of the revision of the peace
treaties.
When Hitler came to power in Gennany,
the result was not, however, as many had
expected, a quick Italo-German rapprochement.
On the contrary, tension developed between the
two countries. Italy had always felt uneasy
over the acquisition of South Tirol. Austria
could not, of course, reclaim that proviJlce;
hut if Nat,ional Socialist Germany were to
merge with Austria then, Italy feared, Ger.
many might do so. Therefore, Italy tried to
~plit up the re\~iRionist camp and to make her-
self the leader of one part of it, Germany being
the loader of the other. In the so-called Rome
protocols (I !J34, W30) Italy, Austria, and
Hungary agreed to co-ordinate their foreign
l'olicie~. At. that timc Italy's opposition to the
A nschl·u.ss of Austria to German)' brought lwr
closer to Franee than Rhe had been since Ver-
saillcs. The Mussolini·La\'0,1 treaty of l!J35
was meant to iron out. all major points of
friction between Italy and France, ami Ger·
many':! rearmament resulted in the Italo-
Franco·British Conference of Stresa in April
1935. Had :France's chance come to win Italy
back into her camp, to tie her down to active
participation against Germany'! Once again
Germany seemed to face the united front of the
Versailles powers.
But in the great game of the powers a new
card appeared-and one must always reckon
with the appearance of new cards in a game-
AbyStlil1ia. The front of St,reRa collapsed during
thp conflict which broke out between haly and
the two Western powers over Abyssinia. Mus-
solini realized that he had to choose. He cho~e
Germany, and the Kome-Berlin Axis emerged,
a new factor in European politics, as it was not
based on a written alliance but the personal
friendship of the leaders.
Under the impression of the enlllts in Italy
in 1Ma, the evaluation of Italy's political
weight has undergone a change; yet for the
late thirties the formation of the AxiR was of
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TB.E ACID TEST
We have only mentioned the principal al-
liances and pacts of the period between the
two World Wars and have already founel a
confusing numOOr of them. Considerin~ how
much effort the politicians of those two decades
invested in the system of pacts, how great a
role it played in international life, and how
became more and more a true axia wound
which European politics revolved. Eventually
it developed into a regular alliance (1939).
Japan with her strong grie,'ances against the
Anglo-Saxon powers and a politioal ideology
which W88, like that of Germany and Italy,
equally hostile to Western imperialism and
international Marxism, W88 the third power to
join the newly emerging political organization.
The form by which this W&8 done W88 the Anti·
Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan
in 1936, whioh was later joined by Italy and
many other states.
THY. REST
All other alliances or attempts at alliances
taking place in Europe in the period between the
two World Wars can be dealt with summarily.
Poland dreamed of organizing Eastern Europe
under her leadership and concluded a number
of pacts which, although symptomatic of the
mania for pacta of those years, did not, in
distinction to the Little Entente, represent any
real fa(ltor in politics.
Nor did the 8O-called Balkan Pact become a
politicaJ reality. It had no distinct political
object but W88 founded instead on thc idea of
a cultural and regional community. Among
those participating in the negotiations which
went toward its preparation since 1930 were
Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria. Greece, and
Turkey, but not Hungary or Czechoslovakia,
which two latter countries regarded themselves
88 Central European and not 88 Balkan st.ates.
Bulgaria withdrew when it became apparent
that the pact would include a guarantee of t,he
8im"u.s qUJ>, against which Bulgaria had very
justifiable grievances. The other four nations
signed it in 1934.
The Baltic states were united in their com·
mon fear of the Soviet Union. What stood in
the way of their political union W88 the fact
t.hat Finland felt closer ties with Scandinavia
than with the other Baltic states, and that
Estonia and Latvia did not wish to be elrawn
into the Lithuanian-Polish conflict over ViIna.
So at first (1923) there W&8 simply a defensive
treaty between Estonia and Latvia which,
similar to the Little Entente, W88 expanded in
1934 to co-ordinate foreiKll policy. In the
same ycar, Lithll8nia joined the other two by
signing the Baltic Treaty. When the three
states concluded a militarY alliance, Moscow
used this 88 an excuse for invading them
with the Red Army on June 15, 1940.
the greatest consequence. It brought about a
close foreign-political collaboration of Germany
and Italy, and the high rating or overrating of
,Italy's actual strength contributed to the rapid
change of the F~uropeanmap during the follow-
ing years.
GERMANY
The foreign policy of Gel'JDany, the victim of
Versailles, cannot be compared with the foreign
policy of the three great powers analyzed 80
far. Following upon her defeat, Germany W88
condemned for a long time t-o be entirely passive
in the foreign field In addition, her early
governments were primarily interested in do-
mestic affairs. So her initial foreign polic)'
consisted merely in carrying out the orders of
the victors.
The first independent action of the Weimar
Republic in the field of international relations
was the conclu!lion of the RBpa.1l0 Agreement
with Soviet Russia in 1922. In its text it was
anything but sensational, not much more than
the liquidation of the war between the two
countries, a liquidation which had become
necessary since the German-RU88ian peace
treaty of Brest Litovilk had been annulled in
the German-Allied armistice terms of WIS.
Yet Rapallo became a sensation because it
seemed to herald the beginning of an independent
German foreign policy and because the victors
had never overcome their fear of a poSllible
Gennan·Soviet co-operation against the capital-
ist powers. They need not have worried.
Such intentions were far from the minds of the
men who led the German Government, the
intellectual Rathenau or the bourgeois Wirth.
Under Stresemann, too, that is, since September
1923, Germany followed a clearly Western-
orient~ foreign policy, fulfilling to the best of
her ability the obligations foreed upon her at
Versailles, at the same time trying to reduce
them to reasonable proportions. The conclu·
sion of the so·called Berlin Treaty between
Germany and the Soviet Union in 1926 did not
indicate any change in Germany's orientation
t,oward the West.
It W88 only after Hitler had acoeded to
power in W33 that Germany began to develop
nn independent foreign policy. It had been
the Fahrer's original intention to form close
foreign-political ties with England and Italy.
But as far as England was concerned he did
not succeed. It haa almost always been Eng-
land's polioy to support the second-strongest
European power in order to preserve a balance
of wwer on the CA>ntinent and allow her to
direct her energies toward the rest of the
world. Since the middle thirties, France W88
clearly no longer the strongest power, and 80
the outlines of the E1Uente Cordiale began to
emcrge again. Th" Anglo-German Naval
Agreement of 1935 did not change the situation.
The Berlin-Rome Axis, on the other hand,
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large 1\ measure of pu blic discussion WI\S devoted
to it, we must ask: what were the results?
First of all, which of the pacts were in force
when the test of their worth came in 1938 or
193tl? The answer is simple: aU the important
pacts mentioned in this article were in force,
with the one exception of the Franco-Belgian
alliance. When Belgium witnessed how Ger-
many was able to remilitarize the Rhineland
without either France or England being able to
prev~nt her. she dissolved her alliance with
France on October 14, 193G. She freed herself
from foreign-political obligations and declared
that from now on she Wll.'l going to carryon
a purely Belgian policy of neutrality without
anv allies.
All the ot.!H'r pads were valid-on paper.
Take France. All her alliances and pacts
were in force: with Poland (indefinitely);
Czechoslovakia (indefinitely); Rumania (up to
194G)' Yngoslavia (up to 11:142); and the USSR
(up to 1940). But did :France in any way profit
from her alliances? On the contrary. She
became their victim-a spider choked in its
own web. When at the Mwuch C"onfercncc of
1931) France agreed to the dissolution of Czecho-
lilovakia, her system of alliances, although
legally still intact, was shattered. Czecho-
Iilovakia ceased to exist at first as a. political
fact,or a.ml soon even as a state. This led
automatically to the collapse of the Little
Entente. Moreo\'er, the Soviet Union was
completely estranged by France's attitude to-
ward it during the days of Munich, and in
August HI3lJ she concluded her treaty with the
Reich. The only alliance which had not been
affected by these events was that of France
with Poland. Partly owing to this alliance,
Poltlnd felt that she could afford an attit.ude
toward the USSR which was responsible for
the failure of the French negotiations with
Moscow in 1939: and it was the alliance with
Poland which drew France into the second
World War and entailed her quick defeat.
Once in the wa,r, France was not supported by
It. single one of her allies. The Maginot Line
of her pacts collapsed no less than the one built
of concrete. Instead she found on her side-
to be sure', in a most unsatisfactory manner-
a country which had constantly· refused to
conclude /l·n aUiance with her: Great Britain.
In a way, one might compare :France's position
in 11139 with Germanv's in 1!))4. In 1914 the
alliancCH which Bi marck had built up for Ger-
many with such pRtience had ceased either to
exist or to be political realities, with the ex-
ception of the alliance with Austria-Hungary
which drew <Jermany into the war and eventual-
I\" into deft·nt.
. And how did t.bo Soviet pact system stand
the test of time! The Bolsheviks overthrew
their nonaggression pRCts themselves when. in
spite cf all t.reat.ies and definitions of aggressors,
the USSR went to war with or occupied Fin-
land, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.
They even left the League when this in,
stitution, in 1939, declare.d the USSR to b&
the aggressor in the war with Finland.
As to the alliances-neither did the Soviet
Union aid C7echoslovakia in 1938 and 1939
nor did it assist, France in IH3U and 1940,'nor
did its pact with Germany prevent the out-
break of the Soviet..German war.
lt is not too much to say: with the exception
of the Franco-Polish alliance, none of the
countless pacts concluded in Europe during the
heyday of pact-making bad any effect whatever
when it came to the showdoWll. .
Nobody even mentioned ttem. Three al-
liances which played a role had come into
being no earlier than 19:19, shortly before
the outbreak of the war: the Anglo-Turkish,
the German-Italian and the Anglo·Polish
ones. All other alliances which were to gain
significance during the second World War,
particularly the German-Japane8e alliance nud
that between the USSR, the USA, and Great
Britain, were not concluded until after t.he
outbreak of war and quite independently of
the post-Great War pact syst.('ms. From the
fact that these are not Eu.ropean but world-
wide alliances we can tell, incidentally, how
greatly the importance of purely European
alliances has dwindled.
THE VALUE OF .-\LLJASCES
SO we now feel skeptical toward the pact,
mania of the twenties and tllirties and are no
longer inclined to regard those politicians who
set their signatures to a record number of pacts
as masters of politics. We are willing t,o
admit, however, that they proved more inven-
tive in the sphere of interstate agreements than
their colleagues of any pre\'ious time. The
aversion for the unpopular alliances led to the
development of new types of treaties which,
however, were often distinguished from an
ordinary alliance only by their official designa-
tion. One can almost speak of fashions which
led at certain times and in the case of certain
politicians to the conclusion of whole series of
similar treaties. Locarno ushered in the series
of the "guarantee pact.s"; the Kellogg Pact.
entailed a whole seri~ of "prohibitions of
aggression" fixed by treaty; the first formation
of a bloc, the Little Entente, was followed after
a short interval by the Baltic Treaty and the
Balkan Pact; the conclusion of "nonaggression
pacts" was a specialty of 80\'iet diplomacy.
With due regard to the League of Nations'
statut.e, all these pact-makers were united ill
their effort to represent any war of oth€T pd\vers
as war and a crime, bllt their aU'll wars not
as war or at least as a permitted war. Thi'
explains the fact that in most conferences and
agreements of the thirties the emphasis W~
placed not on the problem of preventing Wltl'-
like COJlflicts but on determining who was the,
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~or" in a war that had a.lready broken
to This determining of the "aggre880r"
~nted the golden opportunity for the
poIiti~iaD8. Once the blame had been a,ppor-
Wned, the League of Nations' pact in favor
of "the nonaggressor had to come into effect.
This attitude led to international relations
being regarded from a somewhat fonnal legal
point of "iew. Once a pac~was fixed in writing,
Je&led and signed, everything seemed to be in
order; if doubts arose, a new pact was simply
made and pact built upon pact. But while
"attempts were thus .made to fix the relations
between states on paper, actual political con-
ditions were constantly cha.nging. Political
reality and the pacts were on two different
levels, which finally had nothing more in com·
mon and of which the level of reality was by
far the stronger.
Does this mean that alliances or pacts are
utterly senseless? No. But it docs mean that,
in an epoch' of such dynamic impetus as the
period between the two World Wars, the foroes
brought into motion are too strong for them
to be tied down by pacts. In such time.~,
alliances can only have meaning if th06C con-
cerned are prepared to go to the utmost and
not Blink off through the back door of legal
interpretation of one or the other of the para-
graphll. But" contracting partner is only
prepared to go to the utmost if he regards this
&8 being in his own interest or if he is forced
to do so by the stronger partner. In other
words, if an alliance or a pact lega.lizes an
already existing political relationship, if reality
precedes its conclusion, it will probably be of
significance. But one cannot expect alliances
to create political realities.
THREE FRANOO-RUSSIAN AU.IA.NOES
There is another thing to be learned from
our study of the policy of alliances. Alliances
embodying a political threat create suspicion,
unrest, counteralliances, and other conditions
favoring war. A grim example of this are the
Franco-Russian alliances. For the alliance
which De Gaulle concluded with Stalin bn
December 10, 1944, is the third of its kind in
little more than half a century.
In her search for allies for her policy of
revenge after 1871, France had long wooed
Russia. Her opportunity came in 1800, when the
existing RU880-Gennan treaty lapsed. A year
later, on August 27, 1891, France and Russia
signed a treaty which, at the insistence of the
RU88ian Government, was purely diplomatic
and contained no military clauses. But the
French did not give up their quest for more.
They succeeded in getting the Russian signature
to a military alliance directed against Ger-
many, on August 17 of the following year. But
for a further sixteen months the Tsarist Govern-
ment hesitated with its ratification. When in
December 1893, the Russian Foreign Minister
81
Giers put his signature under the document, he
crossed himself and prayed that God might
stop his hand if this alliance were to the detri·
ment of Russia. Gien' hand was not stopped,
yet the alliance proved to be one of the most
detrimental documents signed in modem bis-
tory. It oontributed more than any other to
the outbreak of the Great War and thus to the
collapse of the Tsar's Empire. The outstand-
iug monograph on the first }'ranco-Russian
Alliance was written by the French historian,
Georges Michon, under the title L'Alliance
Franco·R'1U8e. After tracing the alliance's hi.· ,
tory in great detail for hundreds of pages, the
author comes to the conclusion "that it con-
tributed in a large measure to the outbreak of
the most awful cataclysm of modern times."
We have already discU88ed the sinister role
of the second Franco-Ru88ian Alliance. And as
to the thirdl Even less than its two pred-
ece8Son does it dit!guise its aggressive dis-
turbing character-the reader may study it for
himself. Nor did the partners hesitate to
ratify it: it was done within a fortnight in
Moscow and Paris. What future historians wiU
say about the third Franco·Russian Alliance
remains to be seen. But perhaps it will not be
very different from what Michon wrote about
tho first alliance:
The opiniol\Jl current in France in regard to her
aUy RU8llia were utterly at variance with the facts.
The troth is that the facti! were sy1ltematically con·
cealed from the French public . . . . Confidential reo
ports have dillClOtJed the D8t0unding degree of venality
of the le&ding French journals. which for many ye-rs
received subtlidiefl from the RUlIlJian Government. loA
the COf'?-upo,adanl of September 25. 1912, put it:
"The RWI8ian Government t,akOll the n.-ary lIt.ep8
to eOllure that public opinion in Jtnwoo only lmOWl!
what it is meant to know. In 1910. and there ill
110 reason to doubt that the IllUDe state of thiDp
exiau today, the RUllllian Embasay in Paria had at
its d.ispotl&l the IlUm of 1,200,000 franes per annum
for U80 in thill way. 1I0t counting the cost of flnaocial
ad\·erti8ements." ...•
In the mentality of the French bourgcoift' liea the
root C8UlMl of France's blindDe8ll in regard to RUlIBian
aftain. It W88 not that it wu impoeaible to get at
the troth . . . . The fact ia that tbe governing cl_
of France, from wbich ber diplomate, her ataft officei'll
and herb~ men were recruited, did not attempt
to find out the truth, did not in fact wish to know It,
beeaWle tbe crit.ical IIeIUle, the inatinct to invllIItigate,
to inquire, to verify, wu not in accordance witb their
habit8 of mind, and particularly becaWle the Ruaaian
people'. aapiratiOAll were totally at variance with
theIr political and lIOOial idea18 ..•. Ludovio Naudeau
"'ont IlO far as to _rt that: "If anyone had taken
it into biB bead to publiah accurate revelatioDll con·
cerning the great Ru.ian Empire, be would have
made a hOllt of very influential enemiOll. He would
very likely have been accu* of attempted blackmail,
of being a contemptible hack in aearch of huall.money.
and it is by no means certain tbat patriotic citizena
would no~, have called him a pro.Gennan without
1U0re ado. . •..
How contemptible they now BOund, thoee paea.na of
aduhttion, thoee fervid expl'1l88iona of faith in the
Rueaian giant, uttered. . • to silence tbe Il&crilegioUl
tongua and proclaim, in a voice trembling witb emo-
tion, tbe holin_ of the Alliance, tbe nobility of /lOul
of the Taar, and the migbt of the RU.lIIIian army. It
wu a apectacle in which tbe elementa of the sinister
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It is appalling to see how, in spite of I\H the
les.OJons of the period between the two World
Wars, the 8)stem of pa.cts is rearing its head
again. For the Stalin·De Gaulle treaty is not
the only one. There is also the Stnliu-Bene
treaty of December 12, 1943 (see Tlte XXth
Cent'ury, March 1944, p. 233) which, like the
alliance of 1935, aims at turning Czechoslovakia
into au outpost of the Soviet Union in Cent,ral
Europe. There hilS oven been talk of a new
Entente Cordiale and a Balkan entonte.
The statesOlen of the Allied caOlp nre re-
turning to the well-trodden but certainly not
reliable path of a policy of European pacts.
This is just one more proof of their reactionary,
sterile Olentality. If Europe ill not to
be swallowed up utterly by chaoll, it must
find a way out of this vicious circle. The
fratricidal European systems of alliances and
counteraUiances must be replaced by the co·
operat,ion of all of Europe. The goal cannot be
the resurrection of old PlIocts but only the crea·
tion of a new Gren,ter Europe.
ment disliked by the USSR. Thus all the
potential enemies of the Soviet Union become
tho enemies of Fl'll.l1ce.
(3) France promises economic aid to the
USSR. On the basis of the first .Franco·
H.ussiall Alliancc, the French nation had
pumped many billions into Russia (Ii billioll8
up to 1914, not counting the loans during the
Great War) of which the French creditors
practically never saw anything again as the
Soviets repudiated the debts of the previous
governments.
(-I) If in the first and second alliances France
felt more or lesl:I t\l1 equal of Russia, she cannot
do so now for three reMons: never before ha\'e
the French communists-who take orders from
Moscow rather than from Paris-played such a
role in Francc ll8 today; J<"'rance lacklol the
diplomatic support of her former Ea:;tern
European allies, as all of them-Poland, Benes's
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia - are
IlnderSoviet oontrol; if the treaty is carried out,
France is forced into perpetual enmity with
Germany and thereby becomes completely
dependent on Soviet support.
and the grotesquo w re equally blended ....
Far from protesting against the 8OCrooy of the
trenty and donmnding details of i'-rance's commit.
ments, the RacJicmls ... showed that they regarded
the Alliance primlLrily as an instrument of rovenge
ILgainn Germany .. , . They shollid have seen Ihat
the adoption of all .~rcssive for<,ign policy by allied
HU8llill would expollQ France I~ the IItmo t peril ....
The Alliance hocl the effect of calliling democrlLt ic
"'rILnOO to acqui~o and a....i8t in the xpansion and
uccess of IUl ILuto 'rney which W1\8 oppoaed to all I,ho
principles for which sho stood-a IlUCCOilll, moreover,
which could, a..~ IL rille, only be al tained tLt the expense
of France's rool innucnc.e in the world .... The ulti.
mote condomnat,ion of the }o'mnco·Ru811wn Alliance
lies in this-that, it drew its strength from the deKrIl'
dation of t,he two peoples ... that it served to bolster
III' one of the mo t abominable regimes known to
hi.story ....
The Russian ,\lIiIUlce formil ono of the blackNlt
pagll8 in French history .... The "itIolotion" from
which it it! allegod to have rescued her was infinitely
le8s dangerolls, lUI 8ubsoquent events have proved,
than the risks she incurred of being dragged into war
for objects alien to her vittl.1 intermIts .... There
mU8t be added the lUlpreoodented moral bankruptcy,
tho betrayal of the ideals and the \'or~' meaning of
democracy. The Alliance was a Btonding insult to
the memory ef I,hose who, by the force of t,heir in·
tellect or the 8IlCrifice of their lives, founded the French
Republic. h clln no longer be doubted thllt it was
Fro.llce's financial, material, and moral support that
... consolidated the most loa.th80mo autocracy
knowll to lIi~tory, tho object of world· wide contempt
and in cOn!lOC(lIonce perpotunted tho oppression of a
niLtion .... LOl Frllncc not ouI\' ttl.ke control of her
foreign relation ; lel her shun the wholo policy of
IlUianCCil, which Ilro aLways liable, in certain hands,
to become ..n inHl rument of imp rialiJlm nnd war.
Let her at I....t rOlllilo the \,rue end of democracy by
oxercising a COlljjt..lnt 8l1pen-ision over her political
representotives, lIer "lltatesmen," and her preMS. whoso
contemptiblo tic!, nhout Russia will be Iln everlasting
lltigma lIpon tho I'rollCnt regime.
Do these words of Michon not l;ound as if
they were written about the third or second
rather than about the first Franco-I{,ussian
A.lliancc! All olle has to do is to replace the
words Tsar ami T:;arist by Stalin and Bol·
shevist.
But we do not have to wait for the future
historian to I:Itate the following few facts about
the De Gaulle·Stalin pact:
(1) Just 88 t,he second Franco-Russian pact
was irreconcilable with the spirit of the League
of Nations, so is the third one irreconcilable
with the spirit of 1\ new postwar world·security
system as envisaged by the Allies.
(2) Article 5 makes it impossible for France
to establillh close relations wrth any govern.
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TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF EUROPEAN TREATIES, ALLIANCES, AND PACTS
The treaties, etc., nre listed 1\8 follows: date of signing, 8ignatories, place of ilignillg, object, period of v.~lidit,y.
June 28, 1010 Ver8ailles Treaty inc\. League of Na·
tions' Covenant, most parl,icipants in
tho Great War.
JWlO 28, FrI\llCe, USA. Versailles. Alliance against
Gerlllan att.ack. Not ratified b>' US
Senate.
JWle 28. Frlulco, Great Britain. \'ersaiUes. AI·
liculce against German atttlck. Never
validated.
Feh. 2, 1920 Soviot Russia, Est,onill. Dorpnt,. Peace
treAty. recognition of ESlonia's so"er·
eignty by Soviet RU88ia.
July 12, Soviet RUllSia, Lithuania. Mosco\\'.
Peace trent>', recognition of Lithua-
